Empathy as Direct Perception by Beckman, Elizabeth
Beckman  1 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
























Undergraduate Honors Thesis 
Advisor: Prof. Ram Neta 
__________________________
Beckman  2 
 
Introduction to the Primary Debate on Empathy 
In 2016, Xiaolin Wu and Xi Zhang of Shanghai Jiao Tong University supplied neural 
networks with 1,856 facial images from a sample, half from convicted criminals and half from 
non-criminals (no mugshots were used). In their paper hosted by arXi, an open access pre-print 
service at Cornell University, they claimed that a trained Convolutional Neural Network could 
determine criminality with a success rate of 89.5%.  In other words, they proposed physical 
regularities (such as lip curvature) that seemingly correlated with “criminality,” which did not 
originally appear in quotes. Almost immediately, the social responsibility and methodology of 
the study came under fire.    
Without a background in machine learning, I do not feel confident commenting in depth 
on the methodological flaws (of which there are likely many). However, for our purposes, we 
can admit some skepticism about a neural network’s ability to objectively discriminate 
meaningful patterns. This means that a proposed picture of “criminality” needs a lot of a priori 
justification that wasn’t there.  In a Medium blog post, Google software engineer Blaise Aguera 
y Arcas points out that “deep learning can’t extract information that isn’t there, and we should be 
suspicious of claims that it can reliably extract hidden meaning from images that eludes human 
judges” (86). Furthermore, Wu and Zhang explicitly tie their work to a `related study in which a 
team of Cornell researchers found that human subjects were able to discern pictures of criminals 
versus non-criminals (Valla, Ceci, & Williams).  
As a result, one interpretation of the study is that all the Shanghai team did was model 
what humans already do -- so then what exactly is that? Perpetuate biases based on dimensions 
of “trustworthiness” versus “untrustworthiness,” it seems (Aguera y Arcas). Now, the algorithm 
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itself is objective in that it inherently bears no bias, but the input and output, on which the 
network is trained to detect pattern, aren’t so much objective. Wu and Zhang assume that judicial 
verdicts (outputs) are accurate and that the same person’s “criminality” appears the exact same 
way in all photographs (inputs) despite situation or expression. While the researchers were 
supposed to control for expression, it is clear, upon intuitive glance, that many of the isolated 
non-criminals in the sample data seem to be smiling (Aguera y Arcas).  
So why bring this study up at all? Because, as Aguera y Arcas points out, “it is very 
difficult to fully separate emotion — even simple impressions like whether a person is smiling or 
frowning — from the identity of the face itself” (72). What humans do, and what the neural 
network here seemed to do, is judge the similarity of a supposed “neutral” face to an emotional 
expression. Unlike “criminality,” emotional expressions have physical regularities we are hyper-
attuned to. And we depend on them for making all kinds of judgments, such as trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness. Regardless of whether secondary judgments are warranted, I will provide a 
backstory, in this paper, for the reliability of perceiving emotion in the face. 
When trying to understand the mental mechanism of empathy, philosophers have often 
ignored the ways in which the face is un-ignorable. Instead, the debate has centered on whether 
we create and apply theories of other minds or whether we simulate the experience of others by 
putting ourselves “in their shoes.” 
On the “theory-theory” approach to empathy, we ascribe a set of beliefs to another agent 
in order to explain perceived behavior. And reversely, upon assuming a set of beliefs about 
another, we can form some predictions on how they may act. When I observe my sister peering 
into the fridge, I might ascribe to her the feeling of being hungry, the belief that the fridge 
contains food, and predict that she is about to eat something. The theory-theory asserts that this 
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folk psychology is actually a psychology in that these mechanisms are performed by certain 
cognitive functions in the brain. Whether or not these ascriptions are true is a separate matter 
(Dan Dennett, for one, holds a view of intentionalism, derived from a kind of instrumentalism--
that these ascribed belief states are true insofar as they adequately predict behavior). 
Social and developmental psychologists have also been drawn to these problems, and 
have proposed their own accounts of mindreading, or how we make sense of others’ mental 
states. Empiricists like Alison Gopnik maintain that mindreading is akin to a scientist developing 
a theory. Children are not born with an ability to explain behavior, but they gradually construct 
theories, which are modified each time they encounter an anomalous circumstance. Gopnik 
would say that the account of my sister’s midnight snacking ritual is not a theoretical framework 
I was born with -- instead, I likely learned, by experience, what she, or anyone for that matter, 
might do in a state of hunger. Nativists, on the other hand, assert that there is not enough 
experience that can properly account for the sophistication of my theory of other minds. This 
poverty of the stimulus argument maintains that there is an inherent mental structure (perhaps a 
module of sorts) that is designed to apply a general theory of mental content and behavior to a 
variety of specific circumstances (Ravenscroft). 
It seems like a natural step here is to consider the following question. Why do we need to 
have a specific mental theory or framework for others at all? When I see my sister approach the 
fridge, how do we know that I’m not just imagining reasons that I might have for opening the 
fridge if I were in her position, and thus just projecting my own experience? This objection is 
proposed by the mental simulation model of folk psychology which holds that mindreading is a 
matter of such simulation -- I represent my sister’s hunger state in my mind in order predict she 
will go to the fridge (or vice versa, depending on the given information, I visualize a mental state 
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I might have to explain the behavior I observe). I use my own decision-making framework to 
explain her behavior; I just input her own beliefs instead of my own. There is no need for me to 
have a separate theoretical framework, simulationists argue (Barlassina). 
The theory-theory and simulation theory have, to my mind, different and interesting 
implications for empathy. Is it important that, when offering to help another, I might perceive 
their suffering only in reference to my own? Are simulations more epistemologically limited 
than a folk psychological theory of others? Theodor Lipps’s theory of empathic projection is 
based in these similar kinds of simulations. Lipps argues that we notice some physical character 
of experience in another, which triggers an internal process similar to that which we experience 
when make the same expressive gestures. We then project the other to undergo this same process 
and experience a similar feeling. Max Scheler explicitly takes issue with Lipps’s belief that 
understanding another is necessarily a simulation within oneself (and detached from the other’s 
actual experience) -- Scheler, on the other hand, believes there to be a direct connection: 
“[The] relationships between expression and experience have a fundamental basis of 
connection, which is independent of our specifically human gestures of expression. We 
have here, as it were, a universal grammar, valid for all languages of expression and the 
ultimate basis of understanding for all forms of mime and pantomime among living 
creatures” (Scheler 11). 
 
For Scheler, Lipps’s account incorrectly presupposes knowledge of the other, which he takes to 
be essential for empathy or “fellow feeling.” It is not clear, for him, why imitation would yield 
any sophisticated knowledge of the other’s inner life. Even if a similar feeling does get triggered, 
we cannot claim to know anything of the other. All this triggered process can do is “confirm the 
belief that it is my self which is present ‘all over again’” (Scheler 242). To Scheler, this all seems 
like a mind-matching guessing game; there is no guarantee that such a projection is accurate to 
there actually being a mind on the other end. Furthermore, such projection seems impossible for 
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an infant with little experience available to analogize. Analogical inference seems like too 
rigorous a cognitive feat to explain why newborns are responsive to smiles (Zahavi 121). 
 Empathy has to start with the perception of another human being before us. However, the 
often favored simulation argument seems to propose that perception stops right with surface 
features. We perceive there is someone in front of us, but the knowledge of their pain comes 
from simulation, the argument goes. While I do agree that simulation is likely employed across 
the spectrum of empathic experience and importantly adds to it, I see no reason that part of the 
understanding can’t come from perception itself. Instead, I argue two main points: one, it is 
possible to perceive, not infer, meaning, or emotion, just with visual stimuli (such as faces); two, 
environmental and physical regularities bias what we grasp and thus partially determine what we 
empathize with. The second point is supported by a causal story, provided by Mitch Green, in 
which forms of expression and communication arose due to evolutionary benefit and incur 
“organic meaning.”  
 
Introduction to the Argument 
 An alternative to the simulation account of empathy is the one put forth by many 
phenomenologists. On their view, empathy concerns direct experience of the other. It does not 
employ, for example, complex theorizing or simulating on the part of the empathizer. Max 
Scheler goes so far as to describe a “perceptual theory of other minds” (Zahavi 118), implying an 
almost primitive and automatic nature to empathy. Furthermore, empathic understanding is a 
self-transcending project for Scheler (Zahavi 119). It is important to note, however, that Scheler 
does not claim that empathy is in any way mind-reading magic -- he maintains that the inner 
mental lives of the other remain obscured. And that this perception “neither entails that the 
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other’s experience is literally transmitted to me, nor does it entail that I undergo the experience I 
perceive in the other” (Zahavi 118). So, what then, is actually being perceived? What is the 
perceptual system of the empathizer picking up from the person in front of them? 
 For one, Scheler believes, we perceive the “expressiveness” of another before we actually 
register more concrete details like eye color (Zahavi 122). We do not infer, add up, or attribute 
meaning to gestures -- instead, human expressions and communication are inherently 
meaningful, and all we do is grasp it. We do not “first see inanimate objects and then animate 
them through a subsequent addition of mental components. Rather, at first we see everything as 
expressive” (Zahavi 122). If I wish relay to my sister that our mother appeared upset, I would not 
do so by stringing together a list of gestures, and physical movements that would immediately 
indicate to my sister that my mother is upset. Scheler realizes that: 
“In the majority of cases, it will be quite hard (and artificial) to divide a phenomenon 
neatly into its psychological and behavioural aspects: think merely of a groan of pain, a 
laugh, a handshake, an embrace. In his view, affective and emotional states are not 
simply qualities of subjective experience; rather, when expressed, they become visible to 
others.” 
 
Instead, I would tell my sister that our mother seemed upset, that her sadness was visible to me. 
Well, one might contest, that is simply an impression you got, and could be easily erroneous.  
The short answer to this objection is that such an emotional “impression” could be 
erroneous in the same way I may mis-perceive a red tomato to be another color, in just the wrong 
light. It is distracting to focus on the ways in which emotion perceptions can go wrong for this is 
not unique to emotion.  When we perceive “the expressions of others, we can be said to 
experience their psychological states,” and in turn we can experience the minds of others just as 
we experience the sounds of their voices (Zahavi 121). Suffering, in some ways, seems just as 
perceptually primitive as color for Scheler. Sure enough, we make errors in color perception all 
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the time but this does not call into question the reliability of perceiving color in general.  
 So how plausible is this view anyway, given current theories about human perceptual 
systems? First, we might want to determine what kind of things we can immediately perceive of 
an object versus what kind of things we internally infer or attribute to it. One example given to 
show this distinction is that of an English speaker seeing a passage written first in English, and 
then the same passage written in Russian. The first passage is meaningful to him, while the 
second is not -- what accounts for this difference? One view holds that the participant’s English 
allows him to infer what the words mean in the first case only. Jennifer Matey challenges this 
account with empirical data to suggest that this semantic character can actually be perceived and 
not inferred.  
 In some cases, visual representation of semantic character seems to explain faster 
response time. First, Matey walks us through two cases in which a subject is asked to pick out 
“three.” In the first case, the grapheme “3” is displayed on the backdrop of other distraction 
graphemes (like “1” or “5”). In the second case there are no graphemes, just pictures of tools, 
each of which is listed as representing a certain number. Expectedly, the second task takes longer 
-- Matey argues that this is because a process of inference is required, whereas in the first case 
the subject’s visual representation “3” simply “pops out” as representing the semantic character 
of “three” (Matey 4). These findings suggest that some inference is required, as tools don’t mean 
numbers to the average perceiver.  
 Do suffering, pain, and joy just “pop out” to the empathizer in this way? If so, we will 
want to pick out exactly what, in our observation, “pops out” to us. Is it their facial expressions 
or the trembling in their voice? Scheler seems to think so:  
“For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in 
his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his 
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entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in 
the gnashing of his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of 
his thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’, for 
it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a ‘complex of physical 
sensations’, and that there is certainly no sensation of another person’s mind nor any 
stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable 
theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts” (Scheler 260). 
 
The question now is: how does such mindedness get into the perception? It seems plausible that 
empathy is a process of suddenly grasping; I do not want to dispute that. However, it is still not 
clear what characteristics of the object (of empathy) are accessible through perception. The 
aspects Scheler has listed all seem to be plausible objects of empathic perception -- grimaces, 
tears, laughs, and so on. However, he still needs an account of empathy from afar. How is it that 
I can empathize with characters, strangers, or friends who text me their concerns?  
 For the moment, I want to ignore the issue of distance and continue trying to make sense 
of direct empathic perception in Scheler’s face-to-face condition. After all, there may be 
something unique going on in these up-close cases that we need to describe. And no matter what, 
there does seem to be a dimension added to empathy when we encounter the subject face-to-face. 
So, Scheler’s intuition to acknowledge that something seems apt. Let’s consider another 
empirical case from Matey, in which semantic character (for our purposes, something beyond the 
obvious physical characteristics of an object) seems to be impossible to ignore. If semantic 
character is just a matter of inferences, as Matey’s opposition contends, we should see evidence 
of conscious directive and control -- nothing like a glaring headlight we have to shield our eyes 
from. But in STROOP experiments, color (semantic character) seems to be just that un-
ignorable: 
“Participants are shown a column of color words (i.e. “red”). Each word is presented in 
an ink-color that is either congruent or incongruent with the color that the word refers to. 
Perceivers are slower to identify the color the word is printed in when it is incongruent 
with the word’s meaning. But why? If proficient readers represent semantic value in 
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visual experience, then visual experiences of those words will dispose judgments about 
their meanings. When a word’s meaning is incongruent with its color, to identify color, 
this disposition must be overridden. This is a time consuming process, relatively 
speaking, and identification is delayed” (Matey 5). 
 
Here what is happening, according to Matey’s theory of visual representation, is that semantic 
character is inextricably bound with the text. The subject, when seeing RED printed in green, 
perceives the color red as well as green. This is why it takes them longer to choose green as the 
color of the text -- there are competing semantics in the perception.  
 Now, it seems that if semantic character can be perceived, perhaps emotional character 
can be perceived as well. When we hear a friend describe the story of their tragic accident, we 
may perceive emotion, namely sadness, in addition to the literal meaning of their words. Maybe 
it is simply a matter of what decibel they speak at, or some specific pattern of sound that our 
minds register as sorrow. But does this tell the whole story of empathy? Because Scheler insists 
that communication, and thus the transfer of knowledge, is what allows for a more complete 
perception of another mind. Sounds and sights can only do so much -- the more we learn of 
another’s situation seems to correlate directly with how much we empathize. How can we 
account for this relation, even admitting some level of emotional perception?  
In the next section, I intend to show that there are cases, namely synesthesia, in which 
individuals certainly perceive meaning. If it is possible for a subset of the population to 
systematically perceive colors in numbers, then we should not find it altogether implausible that 
humans, in general, perceive emotion in the faces of their peers. Explaining synesthesia and 
empathy, I hope to show, does not require inference. Instead, facial expressions have arisen as 
meaningful patterns to which our perceptual systems are attuned. In developing this argument, I 
will point to Nico Orlandi, whose non-inferential account of visual perception gives us a model 
for developing a non-inferential account of empathic perception. On Orlandi’s account, invoking 
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Natural Scene Statistics, a way of studying environmental regularities as a way to predict 
perceptual output (i.e., what is seen based on the frequency and makeup of scenes external to the 
seer), bypasses a need to explain vision through inference. I suggest that empathic perceptions 
are determined by similar sets of regularities.  
 
A Look at Synesthesia  
When we encounter a person who has just stubbed their toe, what we perceive in them, 
Scheler maintains, is not the particular pain of toe-stubbing. What we perceive directly is the 
suffering itself. However, what do we make of people that do experience pain when they witness 
the pain of others? Furthermore, it seems that these so-called mirror touch synesthetes experience 
particular pains in their own bodies, corresponding to the location at which the actual sufferer 
experienced the toe-stub, blow to the stomach, wherever (Banissy). This reaction is thought to be 
enabled by mirror touch synesthesia, in which the neurons responsible for firing when our bodies 
experience a particular pain, fire when we witness that pain in another. 
What Scheler wanted to avoid, by denying any pain felt by the observer, was the claim of 
analogical inference. He did not want to argue, for example, that we understand another’s pain 
because the sight of them triggers a pain response analogous to that of the sufferer before us: 
“By arguing that our understanding of others is inferential in nature, according to Scheler 
the argument from analogy opts for a cognitively too demanding account. From very 
early on, infants are sensitive and responsive to facial expressions. But to suggest that the 
child compares the visual presentation of, say, the other’s smile with the facial 
movements he himself makes when happy, and that the infant then projects his own felt 
happiness into the invisible interiority of the other’s body, is psychologically 
implausible” (Zahavi 121). 
 
Here, Scheler is responding to Theodor Lipps’s theory of analogical inference that is likely 
different from modern simulation theories in many ways. But for now, all I want to clarify is that 
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Lipps is committed to a direct physical connection, between the expression and the imagination, 
that most simulationists probably do not maintain. Scheler finds it implausible that for every 
wince I witness, I infer what kind of pain I’ve had before that produced a wince, and then project 
that pain onto the other. Now, Scheler does not say anything about pain felt in the perception. As 
much as mirror touch synesthesia lends itself to simulation, it is equally compatible with a direct 
empathic perception as proposed by Scheler. If we can directly sense joy in laughter and sorrow 
in a somber voice, certainly some people will sense it more. If empathy is a perceptual capacity, 
some individuals will have better attuned systems than others. Furthermore, there may be a 
subset of the population with significantly more attuned systems, which may turn out to be 
mirror touch synesthetes. However, a question still remains: whose pain is it anyway? Do we call 
the pain the synesthetes experience their own, or the pain of the person they witness? Trivially, 
the sensation occurs in their body, so we must concede it as theirs. However, if we are committed 
to a phenomenological account of empathic perception, we may be tempted to argue that these 
synesthetes have heightened perception and thus pick up more of the other’s pain. More of the 
other’s pain “pops out” at them.  
Maybe this confusion can be clarified after looking at a different type of synesthesia. 
Number-color synesthetes experience visual color photisms when shown a grapheme like “4.” A 
subset of these people, synesthete-savants, is able to compute mental arithmetic much faster than 
the general population. What accounts for this difference, Matey argues, is an ability to represent 
semantic information visually. One such savant describes this capacity: 
“It is much easier to conceive of the possibility that a human mind might be capable of 
recalling over 22,500 consecutive digits of Pi, particularly when, as in my case, it is able 
to “chunk” groups of numbers spontaneously into meaningful images that constitute their 
own hierarchy of associations” (Matey 2014, 154). 
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Chunking is a process we all use -- it is the practice of dividing up information into meaningful 
units that expand our working memory’s limited capacity of around 4 units (APA Dictionary of 
Psychology). If some portion of the population simply sees more semantics, sees more meaning, 
they will have an increased ability to chunk and therefore remember (long enough to perform 
mental arithmetic). What is important to take away, Matey emphasizes, is that these savants are 
not inferring colors -- the colors come to them at once, quickly, and in predictable patterns. 
Otherwise, they would show no improved ability in the speed of their calculations.  
One challenge to this view questions whether synesthetes can misrepresent. If blue 
usually means four, for a particular person, what happens when they are presented with a blue-
colored “7” grapheme? Here, Matey proposes that the synesthete’s photisms might have 
disjunctive content in some cases -- when they represent the blue grapheme, they perceive it as 
either blue or four: 
“...for a synesthete s such that whenever s’s experience instantiates a color quality q, q 
will either represent that the item is a particular color or that it has a particular numerical 
value, or q will represent that the item is a particular color and that it has some numerical 
value” (Matey 2014, 161). 
 
If this is right, perhaps in the case of empathy, mirror-touch synesthetes represent conjunctive 
content. They perceive pain in their own hand and the pain of the other’s. It is possible that they 
are not better empathizers in that they perceive more of the other’s pain experience. What they 
experience is perception of another’s suffering and then their own pain, which is distinctively 
theirs and not an extension of the other’s. It could be argued that their pain makes the perception 
more salient, or adds urgency to the experience, but these effects come after. We don’t need to be 
committed to a position that regards mirror-touch synesthesia as a simultaneous dimension of 
perception, nor do we need take it as evidence of simulation.      
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In this section I offered Matey’s analysis of synesthesia as a parallel for how we could 
think about empathy. It is possible for our perceptual systems to detect meaning beyond what we 
might think are more “surface” characteristics. Furthermore, it is possible that this perception is 
direct and not due to a cognitive process of association, simulation, or theorizing. The key point 
is that these perceptions (whether they are color-number perceptions or empathic ones) are 
systematic. So long as this holds, we have every reason to investigate whether certain facial 
expressions, for example, are distinctive signs of certain emotions and perhaps carry what Mitch 
Green calls “organic meaning” (I will return to this in later sections).  
Now, this project calls for a more robust account of perception. Although I find the 
discussion of empathy as a kind of transcending feeling (of both theorizing and simulation) very 
appealing, I want to focus specifically on how such a detection and “grasping” functions. I am 
not directly interested in whether the perception of another’s pain can potentially result in 
theorizing or simulation. What I am interested in arguing is that direct perception, in many daily 
face-to-face situations, precedes all of this. I think something like the “sudden grasping” of the 
emotion happens, but it needs to be fleshed out in perceptual language. It will be imperative to 
determine how exactly we are able to perceive that pain in the first place. Part of this discussion 
on empathic perception requires a clear relation with cognition (where simulation may happen), 
which I will explore in the following section.  
 
Perception-Cognition Divide 
 The debate on empathy hinges on the perception-cognition divide -- both the simulation 
and theory-theory approach are by nature inferential, which puts empathy in the realm of 
cognition. On the other hand, this phenomenological-perceptual account of empathy I wish to 
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defend is, well, perceptual. Part of the work in proposing such an account is charting a detectable 
perception-cognition divide. 
If I wish to argue for empathy as a perceptual capacity, I will need to outline a basic 
account for perception more generally. Such an empathic capacity will not directly line up with 
one sense modality; instead, I think empathic perception is best thought of as a synthesis 
dependent on both visual and auditory input, with some allowance for cognitive connection. On 
an informational level, I can begin to empathize with a stranger who relays the details of their car 
accident. This is surely cognitive, but I also pick up on how they look and how they sound in 
telling me. And especially if I witness such an accident, I will pick up on the extent to which 
their body appears to be in pain, i.e. by visually perceiving the gash in their leg and the wince in 
their face. Consequently, the more directly one is acquainted with the situation, with the object of 
empathy, the more one relies on perceptual capacities. And again, even in cases of direct 
empathic perception, we rely on the synthesis of a wide variety of sensory information. With this 
said, however, I do believe it will be helpful to examine certain senses in isolation. In this 
section, I will look at Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitive, non-inferential account of vision.  
Orlandi does not dispute that something happens in between stimulus presentation and 
perception; what she aims to show in her book The Innocent Eye is that this step is not 
inferential, and furthermore not representational. On Orlandi’s account, we assume 
representations to be structures or states that stand in for something else for which they have 
content (and thus information). Secondly, representations affect behavioral patterns in some 
observable way (10-11). Inferences constitute a process of transition that are “regulated by an 
encoded principle or an encoded assumption even if the representation that encodes the principle 
is not linguistic” (21).  
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 The so-called edge detectors of our visual system do not make an inference that there are 
edges “out there” based on physical input. No, the edge detectors simply activate because of 
what’s out there, because of the nature of the physical input. Orlandi prefers to think of the visual 
system as biased. When presented discontinuities in light, for example, our visual system is 
simply biased to detect edges. This framework has more explanatory value and empirical 
support, according to Orlandi, than the alternative of positing p-representations. P-
representations, in Orlandi’s terminology, refer to the types of encoded principles cognitivists 
about vision suggest. Orlandi is hesitant to posit p-representations because: these principles are 
not available to higher order contexts, they do not inform, and they offer little to no explanatory 
value.  
Previously, I had co-opted Matey’s use of “representation;” I am not committed to a 
defined spectrum of perception-representation in regard to synesthesia. All I meant to show was 
that the color-number synesthete is not making an inference. To argue that they visually 
represent colors in numbers is to say that they see such a phenomenon.  There are no 
environmental regularities to cause synesthesia, but it is clear that synesthetes’ perceptual 
systems are biased towards it. 
Once we have a more complete picture of the environment or context, Orlandi argues, we 
no longer need to posit visual representation in order to explain behavior (which is supposed to 
be a value of positing representations in general). Wired systems, like connectionist networks, 
can and do change. However, Orlandi makes sure to point out that the change looks nothing like 
an inference-based switch: 
“There is no localizable structure that can be identified as a specific rule. When the 
programmer wants to change the way the network responds, she simply adjusts the 
strengths between the units without knowing, and without needing to know, what the 
strengths stand for” (50). 
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The strengths do not represent anything, so a change in representation based on inference is not 
possible. Furthermore: 
“Wired systems are not systems whose behavior is immutable—as connectionist 
networks amply demonstrate. They are systems whose behavior does not change simply 
by virtue of presenting information that runs contrary to how they are set to function” 
(56). 
 
Orlandi contrasts these systems with a human pizza maker who follows a recipe (representation) 
either implicitly or explicitly. He, on the other hand, will change his representation based on new 
information. If this pizza maker suddenly finds himself in possession of new toppings, his 
encoded recipe might change and, consequently, so may his behavior.  
If we think further about potential error-correcting mechanisms, we quickly come across 
Bayesian inference, which is, as evidenced by its name, typically thought to work inferentially. 
Orlandi thinks this is wrong. Instead, she argues, Bayesian models can at least be partially 
accounted by “tracking” which refers to “states of a system are states that operate in a very 
restricted domain— for example, a subpersonal transformation—and that are not de-coupled 
from their causal origin” (59). The way that certain Bayesian hypotheses of what’s “out there” 
come to be preferred, is by being marked as more or less probable. There is no invisible 
inference-maker debating which hypothesis to choose. Orlandi concedes that there could be 
encoded priors (or prior probability) but argues that they are distinct from inferences in that they 
don’t have content and they are not assembled in a premise-like form -- they are not independent 
structures that interact formally with the hypotheses. Instead, Orlandi, asserts: 
 “They rather look like built-in or evolved functional features of perceptions that skew 
visual networks towards certain configurations. They are like valves. In response to the 
environment, they regulate what neuronal arrangements get to be tested by incoming 
stimuli” (82). 
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When it comes to cognitive penetrability, at least with respect to vision, Orlandi and Dretske 
appear to be on the same page. They both regard perception as being fixed by the objects or 
environmental context. Dretske’s Goldilocks test aims to determine what effect cognition has on 
perceptual experience (if any). If an expert, who conceivably has some cognitive difference or 
advantage, cannot revise anything concrete in a novice’s drawing, their perceptions cannot be 
said to be different, according to Dretske. But in the case of ambiguous figures there does seem 
to be an obvious perceptual difference. Take, for example, the infamous rabbit-duck. It seems 
that this figure, observed and repainted by people who see one of its sides, has a significant, and 
perhaps anomalous duality. But what these two opposing interpreters would draw is the same 
pattern of lines and shading. On this matter, the Goldilocks test (and Dretske) would maintain 
that because there is no drawable,paintable, or recreatable difference, there is no visual or 
perceptual difference. 
But is this assessment fair? Why do we have the intuition to say that an object appears as 
a rabbit to one person and a duck to another? Why do we say that ambiguous figures look 
different to different people? The terms “appear” and “look” are laden with perceptual language 
that needs to be unpacked. If Dretske agrees that these figures “appear” in different forms to 
different people, but that there is no perceptual difference, we have to mark down what is left to 
cognition, and how. What is making these figures look different? What does it mean for 
something to “look like ‘x’?” 
One response to these questions would be to assert that the difference lies in labeling. The 
perceptual experience of the duck-perceiver and the rabbit-perceiver has the exact same makeup 
of lines, shading, and so on. The only difference is that the two use different labels, which would 
fall under cognition. However, this seems to be more than a case of labeling. A difference of 
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labeling seems to arise when one person chooses the term “porridge” over “oatmeal,” or when an 
expert and novice, looking at the same tree, refer to it as “Eastern white pine” versus “pine tree,” 
respectively.  Both of these word pairs refer to the exact same food or tree. “Rabbit” and “duck” 
simply do not refer to the same animal. Between the two rabbit-duck perceivers, they are not, 
like the expert, simply finding a new, more specific name for the same visual experience 
(Dretske 164-175).  
Orlandi touches a bit on the perception of ambiguous figures through her discussion of 
binocular rivalry. In binocular rivalry, both eyes are shown two separate images. Instead of 
seeing some kind of compromise of the two, the observer shifts in perceiving one over the other. 
In these kinds of cases, how does our visual system “decide” which image to perceive, or which 
image is really “out there?” Bayesian models are often invoked to explain this phenomenon: “the 
idea is to view the visual system as engaging in a process of hypothesis formation and 
confirmation where prior knowledge of the world plays a crucial role” (Orlandi 75). It is 
unlikely, in real world situations, that two objects will inhabit the exact same spatiotemporal 
location. This is why we do not view both images. In the case of the rabbit-duck, perhaps a 
shifting perception between both animals is due to the flexibility of this kind of hypothesis-
testing. However, we still need an explanation for why certain hypotheses start off being favored 
over others. In other words, it is “clear how hypotheses are tested but not how they are formed” 
(90). 
If such a “hypothesis space is infinite,” we need to account for why the number of 
hypotheses entertained and tested is limited. We can understand that priors influence hypothesis 
selection based on repeated exposure and probability, but we also need to know where the 
hypotheses come from in the first place. Natural Scene Statistics (NSS), according to Orlandi, 
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can offer the groundwork for determining why our visual systems are predisposed to posit some 
perceptions over others: 
“One of the fundamental ideas of NSS is to use statistical tools to study not what goes on 
inside the head, but rather what goes on outside—for example, what are the likely 
environmental causes of retinal images. NSS is interested both in what is more likely 
present in the environment or, more tractably, in how probable a given cause is, and in 
the relationship between what is in the world and the stimulus it produces” (63). 
 
Such a process entails, for example, analyzing a large number of scenes to determine the 
incidence and frequency of edges or certain degrees of luminance. In doing so, we can 
statistically determine the common context and manifestation of certain physical properties. 
Consequently, we can start to explain why we have some of the perceptual biases we do.  
So how does this enter into a discussion of empathy? For one, the kind of empathic 
interactions I’m interested in are dependent on visual stimuli. But what kind of environmental 
regularities could such anger-detectors, pain-detectors and so on, pick out? I want to follow 
Orlandi in suggesting that this will primarily be an empirical question. Perceptual primitives for 
empathy are a plausible reality even if we have not discovered them yet. In the meantime, there 
is no reason to believe, in principle, that we aren’t equipped with an empathy-serving perceptual 
apparatus just as we wouldn’t immediately discount the existence of edge detectors. 
Here, I want to be clear that the visual experience or perception does not need to trigger 
simulation in order to bring some empathic grasp of the other’s situation. Many arguments find 
mirror neurons to be compelling neurobiological evidence of simulation -- these positions will 
suggest that mirror neurons are like such pain-detectors that in turn recreate or simulate what that 
experience would be like for the perceiver.  It is true that as one learns more about the other’s 
situation they will gain more cognitive resources with which they could simulate, but this, I 
argue, does not happen at the level of perception. Instead, the emotion of the other is visually or 
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auditorily apparent. Simulation can happen after such detection, but it is not necessary to initiate 
detection. In fact, the term “initiate” is still off the mark -- emotions are object properties one 
cannot miss. While some situations may call the perceiver to look or search for emotion in the 
faces of others, most of this is readily and sensorially apparent. I do not wish to say that 
background information, the story behind the smile, cannot add to the picture. Any account of 
empathy must make room for cognition’s ability to categorize and make sense of visual data. 
This does not mean, however, that cognition necessarily allows for perception in the first place.  
Now that I’ve proposed that empathy is partially dependent on the appearance of such 
emotions, we might ask how apparent are they?  Does my visual system pick up on happiness as 
easily as it detects a table’s roundness or squareness? Furthermore, what can we be said to know 
when we are perceiving such emotions? In the next section I will discuss Joel Smith’s paper 
“The Phenomenology of Face-to-Face Mindreading” in which he delineates different types of 
“seeing.”  
  
On Different Types of Seeing 
To say that I visually perceive another’s happiness requires a certain amount of linguistic 
specificity. There are two branches of perceptual mindreading (attribution of mental states), 
according to Smith. If I say that I see that the car crash victim is in pain, this entails an 
“epistemic visual perception of facts” (5). The psychological form of a perceptual account, on 
the other hand, does not require me to possess any conceptual knowledge. This distinction is 
most easily teased out in the discussion of seeing a boiling kettle. Seeing that the kettle is boiling 
requires concepts of kettles and boiling; I believe the round object to be a kettle and I also 
believe that there is water inside of it rumbling at a temperature that could burn me. Just seeing 
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the boiling kettle, however, can happen even if the perceiver has no idea what the object is. They 
at least have some visual experience of the kettle. Beliefs about the object do not suddenly make 
it apparent. Smith also proposes seeing as, in which some of the epistemic weight from seeing 
that is maintained in a non-factive form. However, he is less interested in charting the boundaries 
of this category as his argument rests primarily on one final form of perceptual mindreading: 
looks. This final form of seeing seems to have more of an external focus on the way objects 
themselves appear.  
Smith claims that, in some instances, emotion is visually present in ways similar to color, 
although perhaps not “manifest to the same degree” (12). He determines three cases presenting 
distinct forms of visual presence: 
“Red Tomato: Fatima sees, in ordinary circumstances, a red tomato on the table before 
her. It looks red and if it were not red it would not look red. Fatima, believing this to be 
so, takes it to be red. 
 
Happy Sylvia: Ivy sees happy Sylvia who is beaming. Sylvia looks happy and, were she 
not happy, she would not look happy. Ivy, believing this to be so, takes her to be happy. 
 
Poker Tell: Aarohi and Shreshta are playing poker. Aarohi sees Shreshta who is visibly 
scratching her chin in a distinctive way. Shreshta scratches her chin this way when and 
only when she is excited during a poker game. Aarohi, aware of this fact, takes Shreshta 
to be excited” (11). 
 
The tomato looks red and Sylvia looks happy, but we cannot say Shreshta looks excited based on 
the description given. The difference between Sylvia and Shreshta is that the former is exhibiting 
a distinctive expression of happiness while the latter is not, Smith argues. Aarohi requires 
knowledge of Shreshta’s particular behavioral patterns in order to infer that Shreshta is excited. 
Intuitively, it is not the case that chin-scratching is a universal sign of excitement. Now, it is a 
difficult question to determine what constitutes such a “universal sign,” one that I think is worth 
investigating and best understood through Green’s conception of “organic meaning.” For the 
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moment though I will agree on intuition alone and accept this distinction in visual presence 
between the Sylvia and Poker Tell case.  
 What’s more troubling, however, is the intuitive leap suggesting Sylvia’s happiness is not 
as “visually manifest” as the tomato’s redness: 
“That is, Sylvia's happiness, whilst somehow characterising Ivy's visual experience, is in 
some sense less than fully available to vision. To see this, compare Sylvia's happiness 
with the upturn of her mouth. Only the latter, I suggest, is visually present in the fullest 
and most intuitive sense, the former only being visually present in virtue of the visual 
presence of the latter” (12). 
 
Smith goes on to categorize the Red Tomato case as one of primary visual presence, the tomato’s 
redness being fully present, and Happy Sylvia a case of secondary visual presence. It is not clear 
to me how a universal sign can be any less universal. If we say something is a distinctive look, 
we have to be careful in suggesting that it has more and less distinctive forms. Furthermore, the 
above claim seems to suggest that one can perceive part of the happiness -- if so, what would 
this mean? We certainly would not say that only part of the tomato’s redness is perceived if it is 
half obscured by a towel. 
To conclude, I agree that both the Red Tomato and Happy Sylvia cases are non-
inferential, but I struggle to see the distinctions in visual presence Smith tries to draw out. I do, 
however, find it fruitful to pursue the idea that there exist distinctive looks of happiness. In the 
next sections, I will investigate exactly how such properties acquire their distinctiveness. 
 
Mitch Green on Organic Meaning 
Previously, I have suggested that emotions have stable and systematic visual 
presentations that provide all the material for perception without requiring any kind of inference. 
Here, however, it’s necessary to give some kind of backstory about these expressions I take to be 
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universally meaningful as presentations of emotion. Thus far I have argued for a baseline 
plausibility, but I have not, for example, justified why we see a smile (as opposed to some other 
facial formation) as a sign of happiness. If researchers alter their stimuli by manipulating degree 
of smiles and then determine empathic capacity by the ability to discern such differences, we 
should have some grounds for assuming the smile is something worth manipulating.  
I want to start by clarifying that researchers are not necessarily in the wrong for treating a 
smile as a natural sign of joy. However, this is not something we should take for granted simply 
because it is intuitive. When we wish to empirically test the perception of emotion, we must 
determine rigorous criteria for assuming that there is a particular emotion there to be perceived 
after all. If there is no thorough understanding or agreement about what emotion definitively 
looks like in the face, there is no way to tell whether a person empathically detects it. In this 
section, I will argue for Mitch Green’s conception of organic meaning as an appropriate 
barometer for psychological studies going forward.  
Green begins by unpacking the distinction of natural vs. non-natural meaning made by H. 
Paul Grice, and determining that there are important cases in between satisfying both sets of 
criteria. Grice asserts that cases of non-natural meaning consistently fail all of the following five 
conditions: 
1. “One cannot consistently say, “Those spots mean measles, but he hasn’t got measles.”  
That is, ‘mean’ in its “natural” usage is factive. 
2. One cannot argue from ‘Those spots mean measles,’ to any conclusion about what is or 
was meant by those spots. 
3. One cannot argue from ‘Those spots mean measles’ to any conclusion about what 
anyone meant by those spots.  
4.  One cannot restate the above example in terms that involve direct discourse. That is, one 
cannot rephrase ‘Those spots mean measles,’ by saying, ‘Those spots meant, “measles,”’ 
or ‘Those spots meant, “He has measles.”’ 
5.  One can restate ‘Those spots mean measles,’ as ‘The fact that he has spots means that he 
has measles.’” 
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A typical case of non-natural meaning, for Grice, is that of traffic cop waving to mean that a road 
is closed. Here, the traffic cop bears a “complex set of intentions” that aim to affect an audience 
in a particular way (Green 2). For example, so long as the traffic cop intends to communicate the 
road is closed, his gesture or utterance means just that, regardless of whether the road is actually 
closed or not. This situation fails the first condition in particular.  
 Green argues that, for cases of non-human animal interaction that do not incur natural 
meaning, the cognitive load implied by Grice’s conception of non-natural meaning is too 
intensive (3). In other words, there are many important cases that fall somewhere between 
Grice’s notions of natural and non-natural meaning; Green calls these cases of organic meaning. 
On the simplest level, information conveyance is a common property of both living and 
nonliving things. However, many non-human animals interact in ways that acknowledge, utilize, 
or exploit this information of another. Information operating in this way can be thought of as 
cues, meaning “a feature F of the environment is a cue for organism C if C is able to use the 
information conveyed by F in a way that tends to improve its chances of survival or 
reproduction” (4). Green maintains that cues are not quite communication, but that 
communication begins at the manipulation of such cues.  
 For example, some cases of warning, threatening or deimatic behavior can set up a stable 
interaction in which both parties benefit from the display. When this happens, we call it a signal, 
which is a “behavioral, physiological, or morphological characteristic fashioned or maintained 
by natural selection because it serves as a cue to other organisms” (6). The octopus flushed with 
vibrant stripes and patterns avoids an attack, and the small shark saves its energy for an easier 
prey (perhaps the octopus has a poisonous bite). Even as these manipulations become 
systematized, the animals involved do not necessarily intend or understanding anything. 
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However, the best explanation, according to Green, is that the signal is something that exists for 
the benefit of the organisms that produce and react to it.  
 It is also true that a different animal with less inherent threat, but the same appearance 
come to be indicative of threat (i.e. it looks like an animal that actually bears the threat), can be 
substituted in to benefit from the same relation. Consequently, if this non-threatening animal 
with the same appearance begins to outnumber the original threatening species, the predators will 
learn to no longer associate threat with that cue or appearance (13). In any case, we have found 
an instance of meaningful non-human animal communication that struggles to seamlessly fit one 
side of Grice’s natural vs. non-natural distinction: 
1. “One can consistently say, “That bright coloration means that the frog is noxious, but it 
isn’t noxious.”  This could plausibly be said of the “mutant invaders”. Accordingly, 
‘mean’ as used here is not factive. 
2. One can argue from, ‘That bright coloration means that the frog is noxious,’ to a 
conclusion about what is or was meant by that bright coloration. 
3.  One cannot argue from, ‘That bright coloration means that he is noxious’ to any 
conclusion about what anyone meant by that bright coloration. 
4.  One cannot restate the above example in terms that involve direct discourse. That is, one 
cannot rephrase ‘That bright coloration means that he is noxious,’ by saying, ‘That bright 
coloration means, “noxious,”’ or ‘That bright coloration means, “I am noxious.”’ 
5.  5. One cannot restate ‘That bright coloration means that he is noxious,’ as ‘The fact that 
he is brightly colored means that he is noxious.’” (10). 
 
Conditions 1, 2, and 5 for natural meaning are not satisfied, and conditions 3 and 4 are. For 
Grice, these conditions were meant to “stand or fall together.” In response, Green supposes that a 
third type of meaning, namely organic meaning, can capture the non-human animal cases 
discussed above. Organic meaning includes a specific type of signaling used by living things 
(11). 
 Now, what of the human smile? Facial expressions, for Green, also mostly constitute 
cases of organic meaning that particularly appeal to psychological states (22). Whereas the snake 
perceives danger in the brightly colored pattern of a frog, we perceive pain in the grimace, 
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sadness in a trembling voice, joy in the smile, and so on. And the reason we do so, I argue, may 
have everything to do with the adaptiveness of prosociality. Under threats of natural disaster, 
intergroup conflict, and food insecurity, the earliest tribes of humans benefited from cooperation, 
whether in child-rearing or hunting/gathering (Simpson and Beckes 37).  Thus we can see a clear 
role for “emotional capabilities that permitted the experience and expression of certain complex 
social emotions, such as guilt and shame, which may have facilitated stronger forms of 
prosociality” (Simpson and Beckes 42). Lastly, a quick glance at the social psychology literature 
can give us an idea of which emotional signs actually exist. Research has consistently shown that 
smiles invoke more helping behavior (Guéguen et al.). 
 We would need a good deal of evidence to claim the snake infers that the frog’s pattern 
means danger. Perhaps the idea is more plausible as we move up the food chain towards animals 
that have cognitive capacities similar to ours. However, the relation is the same -- evolution 
biases perceptual systems despite any cognitive reflection. Although inference uniquely 
characterizes our species, we cannot assume that it permeates every capacity especially when 
that capacity is present in species with markedly less developed cognitive systems: 
“However, the fact that our species uniquely exhibits speaker meaning (assuming it to be 
a fact) does not imply that whenever we communicate, we do so with the full 
psychological repertoire mandated by that notion” (Green 19). 
 
Describing an empathic perceptual system as biased, in Orlandi’s sense, works perfectly well for 
describing both the history and current state of our communications. It explains why, as Scheler 
wondered, infants quickly grasp and respond to smiling behavior. As they grow and socialize, 
they will surely build webs of inferences on such perceptions. They will be able, for example, to 
say their loved one’s grimace results from a struggle with chronic pain and be moved to help 
them up the stairs, to make the kinds of transitions that seem cognitive and inferential. However, 
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the sensitivity to such pain likely stems from a prosocial awareness that arose as a product of 
biological and cultural evolution.  
Furthermore, this sensitivity, this biased empathic awareness, is likely determined by 
external regularities  -- we have no need to posit  “internal resources that supplement the 
stimulus” (Orlandi 45). The snake perceives danger in the frog’s vibrance because such an 
appearance correlated with an “environmental fact,” namely a dangerous and threatening 
situation (46). To review, Orlandi believes: 
“The visual system is biased in this way because of an environmental contingency that is 
relevant to us as biological systems, namely, that edges and light discontinuities are 
highly correlated. We can discover this contingency by sampling a very large number of 
images of natural scenes” (47). 
 
Consequently, if we could measure snapshots of empathic situations in the wild, I believe we 
would find something quite similar. We would find, I argue, that grimaces, pain presence, and 
situations of harm are highly correlated, for example. And to return to a paradigmatic case of 
organic meaning, if we sampled a large number of scenes including a frog, we would likely find 
that certain patterns correlate with poisonousness. The snake’s perceptual system is specifically 
attuned to detect these patterns because sensitivity to such correlations has been evolutionarily 
beneficial. Similarly, the visibility of emotion in facial expressions has been essential to our 
survival as organisms and to the survival of cultural institutions, such as cooperation and 
cohabitation. It is of high social importance that anger, pain, happiness are visible. We would be 
at a great disadvantage if our visual systems could not detect such expressions; sure enough, 
individuals with differences in this regard do struggle with communication. 
 Such is the inspiration behind the Emotional-Social Intelligence Prosthesis developed to 
aid those with Autism Spectrum Disorder. The software reads data from a camera, implanted in 
glasses frame, and detects different facial configurations as defined by Paul Ekman’s Facial 
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Action Coding System (or FACS), and then relays a message diagnosing the emotion of the 
other. FACS works with 28 single action units such as “Nasolabial Fold Deepener” and “Cheek 
Puffer;” emotional expressions can be determined by correlating self-report measures and EEG 
data with combinations of the single action units (Ekman 2012). FACS has been used, for 
example, to typify the Duchenne smile, or what has been colloquially called “smiling with the 
eyes.” In one study, presence of the FACS-interpreted Duchenne smile (“one produced by the 
zygomatic major muscle and the lifting of the cheeks and gathering of the skin around the eye 
were produced by the orbicularis oculi muscle”) could predict whether subjects watched a 
positive or negative video (Ekman 1990).  
 While there are potential issues with substantiating FACS with EEG and self-report data, 
I hope to have provided a theoretical foundation that justifies tracking distinctions in facial 
expression, particularly those that carry organic meaning. The most reliable distinctions, I argue, 
will be those that an awareness of incurs evolutionary benefit. Furthermore, if we could 
determine a particular scene (more rigorous than the playing of a positive video) of human 
communication that correlated with that string of cheek and eye movements, this would help fix 
perceptual content. We would then have no reason to posit simulation as a transition between a 
cheek lift and the impression of genuine happiness.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued for more emphasis on the direct and perceptual nature of 
empathy. What we understand of another’s situation is especially determined by what we can 
perceive firsthand in the face. And what we perceive in the face is likely determined by a 
systematic presentation of evolutionarily important situations. We see grimaces, for example, 
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because of the situations that cause them. Our perceptual systems have become attuned to 
environments that are dangerous and threatening, either to ourselves or others. Interestingly, 
research in machine learning has recently started to incorporate contextual information (a visual 
scene beyond the face) into emotion datasets. Although information on the scene alone could not 
determine the emotion, it did help the neural network with recognition (Kosti et. al, 1673). 
Regardless of how far this research goes, it is clear that the face and its environment are rich with 
information to which our perceptual systems are attuned. While something like criminality may 
not be visible, emotions certainly are. There is much to be empathically perceived, therefore, we 
do not rely on simulation alone to grasp feelings of the other.  
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